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AbstractL-______________________________ 
In this paper we analyze the effects of dynamic environmental policies on firms' optimal 
investment behavior within finite time horizons. We show that when finns are allowed to 
intertemporally trade their emissions, they invest in abatement in earlier periods, advancing 
compliance with future environmental standards. Therefore, policies such us emissions banking" 
enhances the dynamic efficiency of the marketable permits and derives substantial cost-savings 
by itself. We show the dynamics of banking policy and emissions trading when the firm faces 
a two step emission standard with strict requirements at the end of the programo The firm's 
optimaI trajectory under apure banking program is compared to command-and-control (CAC), 
Pigouvian taxes and emissions borrowing, aH for a finite time horizon. Banking introduces time 
flexibility, inducing the firm to over-comply with environmental standards in earlier periods, thus 
buying a delay in adjustment to future tighter policies. Finally, we analyze the dynamics of a 
pure emission trading program, where permits are available in a perfect competitive market, but 
do not last forever. Our results justify the current low trading in the U.S. Acid Rain Program 
(ARP) alld link firm's cost savings to the success of the banking policy. 
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1 Introduction 
One often sees that regulators require certain environmental standards to be met at some future 
point in time, thus creating a period of adjustment for polluters. Global and local pollution 
targets are generally fixed creating more or less explicitly several phases of emission reduc­
tion requirements. The European Union, for example, requires its member countries to reduce 
sulphur emissions in three phases of five years each. At the end of each phase, all countries 
should comply with an emission reduction based on their baseline emissions of 1980 (Directive 
88/609/CEE) or Second (European) Sulphur Protocol (SSPj Oslo, 1994). More recently, the 
U.S. Acid Rain Program (Clean Air Act Amendment, 1990) required electric utilities to reduce 
their rate of emissions for several pollutants according to two reduction phases (1990-95 and 
1995-2000) and using a permit market. Other permit programs, such as the Lead in Gasoline 
Program (1983-86), have generally defined policy dynamics in this terms.1 This 'step' imple­
mentation of abatement targets might be of advantage to the firms for the following reasons: 
it creates a period of adjustment for regulated firms and induces a planning of abatement ac­
tionsj it allows countries to implement specific mechanisms to achieve the required standardsj it 
reduces post-deadline uncertainty and, therefore, it drives technical change towards some long 
run path. 
This paper is motivated by two unclear aspects of marketable perlllÍt markets related to 
the US Acid Rain Program (ARP) , namely, the step implementation of emission standards 
and the finite validity of permits. The program creates an emission permits market within the 
electricity industry that should in principIe increase a utility's flexibility in meeting the emission 
standard in two temporal phases, ending in year 2000. Even though the wide market involved 
and the serious emissions reductions have created important expectations on the program, a 
recent evaluation shows negligible trade among firms (Burtraw, 1996) 2. 
On the one hand, we aim to analyze the role of the period of permit's validity and the time 
horizon of permit's programs to explain current low trade volumes and low prices within the 
programo On the other hand, we aim to evaluate the benefits derived from the intertemporal 
distribution of abatement targets. What happens to the overall emission standard and to firms' 
intertemporal distribution of abatement when intertemporal emission trading is possible"! To 
this purpose, we model environmental policies in finite time horizons and evaluate their impact 
on a firm's optimal investment behavior. 
1This prograrn required refinerles to gradually reduce, and finally eliminate, lead content in gasoline production. 
The program allowed trading reduction quotas among refineries as well as banking savings of permits during 
sorne perlod that could be used to justify emissions in a later periodo It consisted of a stepwise reduction of lead 
content standards. See EPA (1985). 
2There is sorne trade in the rnarket as outsiders are buying permits. However, most finns are reluctant to sell 
the permits that they don't need yet. 
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Actual environmental poliey designs take into account the specifie environmental and market 
structure. Hence, the implementation of permit programs differs far from theoretical permit 
systems. The final time horizon of too programs with limited validity of permits and the 
combination of overa11 and individual emission standards, whieh eharacterizes for example the 
ARP, are two of the aspects that have not been explicitly addressed in the literature. If permits 
are not valid forever, the regulator implieitly requires firms to actually attain some level of 
abatement at the end of the program, whatever the net position of the firm in the permit market 
during the programo Hence at the end of the program, a11 firms must meet the standard. This 
raises the question of what are the potential cost savings from a permit market in sueh a case. 
It can be argned that, even when allocative effi.cieney - exploiting abatement cost differences 
among firms - is only temporal, there are dynamie properties usua11y overlooked in marketable 
permits models that determine market performance and give rise to additional cost savings. In 
this paper we foeus on the role of a firm's investment planning under flexible environmental 
policies. 
Environmental poliey instruments are often analyzed and compared in three main aspects: 
statie efficieney, institutional feasibility, and the impacts on technological change (Milliman 
and Prince, 1989). The last aspect is aloo called dynamie efficieney and, broadly speaking, it 
concerns the incentives poliey gives to po11uters to invest in innovation and the direction in 
which innovative activities are steered. We use dynamie investment in emissions reduction to 
study the incentives induced by permit trading and banking. 
Introdueing a system of marketable or transferable pollution permits implies that scarcity on 
a well defined new good, environmental service, is ereated (Dales 1968). The regnlator establishes 
an overall standard or it distnoutes emission permits among firms according to some rule. Then 
it allows firms to trade tOOir permits or surplus allocations in a well de:fined market. It has been 
demonstrated e1sewhere that this instrument is a cost-effective strategy for addressing po11ution 
problems within a statie once and for a11 setting (Montgomery, 1972; Tietenberg, 1985; Baumol 
and Oates, 1988). 
The properties of pennits are often descnoed using terms sueh as cost-effectiveness and 
allocative or market effieieney. Cost-effectiveness refers to productive effieieney (Mishan, 1980), 
in other words, to a firm's ability to minimize costs to aehieve an externa11y determined standard. 
Cost-effectiveness of marketable permits is proved formally by Montgomery (1972). Permits 
ensure that any environmental objective is reached at a minimum cost to soeiety and abatement 
efforts are alloeated efficiently over a11 firms. However nothing ensures that the bene:fits derived 
from that standard balance the damage costs at the margino Market or allocative efficiency, on 
the other hand, makes reference to the internalization of social opportunity cost of the use of 
the environment as a resource in the price sYstem - social efficieney, - Mishan (1980). 
Montgomery's analysis considered a timeless, statie framework and concentrated on intrafirm 
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trading. However, 'time trading' or the distribution of emissions over time is another important 
aspect to consider when banking permits is allowed, where banking is defined as the option to 
save surplus allowances for future use or sale. We use the term dynamic efjicíency to denote an 
efficient distribution of emissions over time such that (a) an overall standard is averaged during 
the program and/or (b):6rms can distribute their individual emissions over time. 
We focus on banking policy and derive the optimal distnoution of emissions over time from 
the point of view of the individual firm that must decide when to introduce abatement ­
and from the point of view of the regulator - that creates a market to achieve an efficient 
intertemporal distribution of an aggregate emission standard3• 
In the literature, the dynamic properties of permits are, to our knowledge, only analyzed in 
highly stylized frameworks. The regulator establishes an overall standard for emissions. Firms 
can trade permits, depending on how their environmental performance relates to the initial 
distnoution ofpermits. Where a dynamic model offirm's investment behavior is analyzed, the 
time horizon is taken to be infinite 'unlimited permit validity'. Kort et al. (1991) analyses 
subsidies and taxes as alternative instruments to induce pollution abatement to find out the 
optimal investment path for the firm; Xepapadeas (1992) explores the differences between taxes 
and CAC policy through firms investment optimal pathsj Kort (1996) introduces for the first 
time permit markets as an option to the firm, comparing permits and taxes within a dynamic 
framework: under specific investment conditions and infinite time horizons, a uniform tax on 
emissions is equivalent to a permit system if permit prices are actualized every period according 
to the interest rate. 
Cronshaw and Kruse (1991) analyzes the dynamic properties of permits within a discrete 
time model and infinite horizon. They show that, under perfect information and unlimited time, 
an efficient permit price pattern exists for the dynamic market. Firm's abatement is modelled 
as a recurrent cost, investment in technology is not possible. The introduction of banking does 
not yield different results in their analysis. Rubin and Kling (1993) builds on that work an 
intertemporal model of trade and banking to simulate cost saviugs from the light-duty vehicle 
manufactures of hydrocarbon emissions. 
Finite time horizons, besides coming closer to current environmental programs, introduce 
interesting conditions in the specification of dynamic models for permits and, in general, for 
environmental policy. To evaluate performance and effectiveness of intertemporal trading, we 
focus on a permit policy designed to achieve an emissions ob jective by a11 firms (say a total 
emission limit or rate standard) at some point in time. Whatever is the position of the firm 
SH the distribution oí enrlssions over time does not matter in terms oí environmental impact, the overall 
standard defined by the regulator can be averaged by finns íOl the duration oí the programo Then, the surn oí all 
enrlssions during the whole period f: S(t)dt can be the overalI objective oí the regulator, instead oí each S(t). 
This is usualIy the case íor stock pollutants such as greenhouse gases and c1oro{luorocarbons. 
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during each period, it must comply in the last year (when permits are no valid anymore) with 
that objective. This definition implies: first, the combination oftwo instruments, permits and 
individual standard; and second, the introduction ofa terminal condition into the optimal control 
problem (fixed time with fixed end point problem). Given limited time horizons and positive 
discount rates, banking induces firms to start building their abatement capital stock in earlier 
periods and result in significant cost savings as compared to a command-and-control policy. 
A pigouvian tax is equivalent to a banking policy if the tax rate can be adjusted over time. 
Emissions borrowing, on the other hand, delays abatement investment of the firmo Finally, the 
optimal investment trajectory of firms participating in a pure permit market depends on the 
path of permit's price. 
The paper is organi.zed as follows. Section 2 formulates the environmental policy scenario 
and derives the conditions under which the individual firm finds banking advantageous. We 
compute cost savings for the firm from individual intertemporal emission trading - when it 
is free to choose the time-distribution of its emÍS8ions during the program and, therefore, its 
investment in emissions abatement. Optimal trajectories are compared to CAC and tax policies. 
Tbe possibility of a borrowing policy - defined as an earlier use of future endowments of permits 
is explored in section 3. Section 4 derives optimal investment patbs under a similar limited 
time horizon program, when the firm may only trade permits in a perfectly competitive permit 
market within a finite periodo Banking or borrowing ofemissions is not allowed. We characterize 
permit price paths under alternative institutional arrangements. Section 5 concludes. 
Banking as an intertemporal transfer of emissions 
Consider a firm that is faced with a system of tradeable permits during the period [O, Tj. The 
firm is assumed to have minimization of abatement costs as an objective4• In order to focus on 
time fiexJ.oility, it is assumed that the firm is allowed exclusively to bank the permits: it can 
save for its own later use those permits that have not been used, but it cannot trade its emission 
surplus with other polluters. Tbis deliberately limits the use of permits to capture only the 
effects of time fiexibility. In the next section we extend the model and allow trade in permits. 
We assume that the permit program has the following characieristics: the regulator intro­
duces a permit system at time O. A permit is defined as a license to emit some amount of 
pollution at any time during the program, say x tons of 8020 The regulator announces to the 
firm that in the final period T it has to comply with a specific (stricter) emÍS8ion Standard 
l(T). Hence, at some point in time each firm must technically adapt (or reduce output) to meet 
environmental requirements. Permit banking allows the firm to adjust at its own speed. 
4Since often the regulated fum is a public utílity it is not atways appropriate to describe it as a profit maximizer. 
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The firm's production process causes emissions, E(t). Emissions can be decreased by invest­
ment in abatement capital. Let emissions be denoted by E and abatement capital by K, then 
emissions at time tare given by E(K(t)). It is assumed that a higher abatement capital stock 
results in lower emissions, E'(.) < O, and that it is more costly in terms of capital to decrease 
emissions when these are already low, E"(.) ~ O. Given the regulation, the firm will try to 
minimize the amount of money it has to spend on abatement. For a certain standard e, we can 
invert E(.) to find K = E-I(e), the amount ofcapital that is required to satisfy this standard. 
This is denoted by k(e). 
The regulator announces at time Owhat standard e(t) wiIl hold during the period [O, T]. The 
standard beco mes stricter over time, therefore e(t) is a decreasing function of time. 8pecifically 
the foIlowing scheme is assumed: 
e(t) = el tE [O,s] (2.1) 
e(t) = e2 tE (s,T] (2.2) 
The firm is assumed to have enough abatement capital at time Oto satisfy the standard e(O): 
K(O) = k(e(O)). (2.3) 
After this period the emÍ8sion standard is tightened to the final level. This way of standard 
setting is almost equivalent to the ARpS. The firm is allowed to create permits and save these in 
a bank. The firm createS permits if it emits less than the standard e(t). It can bank these and 
use them later. The firm is allowed to emit more than the standard if it has previously banked 
permits to cover the additional emissions. Banking permits inereases the stock of permits at the 
bank, A(t). This stock neither depreciates nor earns interest6 • 
Most regulators are vague about the continuation of the program aftel' time T. For exam­
pIe, the ARP does not specify what will happen with existing permits 01' the 2005 standard 
after the yeal' 2005. The Second (European) 8ulphur Protocol (SSP: Oslo, 1994) specifies new 
intel'national targets for 802, but leave the implementation of future strÍngent standards open. 
A reasonable assumption is that the standard e(T) will remain valido Another possibility is 
that stl'icter standards are implemented. A linear scrap value function S(K,A) = vaA +VkK is 
6See for a description oí thls program fur example N. Kete (1992). The announcement of the ARP induced 
firms to anticipate the first periad standard. When the program started in 1995 most oí the firms already complied 
with the first period limito 
sin the US Emissions 'Ihding Program (1981) banked permits could depreciate according to required environ­
mental quality improvements in the areas implemented (Padrón, 1991). 
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introduced to reflect the expectations of the mm on futuro regulations. When the firm expects 
stricter future regulation, it attaches a positive scrap value to both K and A. On the other 
hand, when the firm expects that a new cheaper technology will be developed it attaches more 
value to A, rather than to physical capital, K. 
The amount of permits banked (or withdrawn from the bank) at a certain time the rate of 
permit banking - is denoted by a(t). The increase in the stock of banked permits is given by: 
A(t) = a(t) (2.4) 
The bank requires firms to hold a non-negative stock of permits, 10ans are not provided. 
A(t) ~ O (2.5) 
Furthermore, the firm is assumed to start with no banked permits at time o: 
A(O) = O (2.6) 
Abatement capital can be accumulated according to a standard capital accumulation funo­
tion: 
k = l(t) - 8K(t) (2.7) 
where 8 is the rate of depreciation and l(t) is gross investment in abatement capital. If the 
firm invests it is subject to adjustment costs. Together with the puro costa of investment these 
are included in the investment cost function C(l). It is assumed that C(O) = O, C'(.) ~ O and 
C" (.) > O. The firm determines its investment in abatement and permits banked at each time t 
to minimize its discounted stream of investment costs minus scrap values at the final time T. 
Given that the firm has to satisfy the standard at any period, the rate at which it can bank 
permits at time t is given by: 
a(t) = i(t) E(K(t)) , (2.8) 
which are the units it emits below the standard. At time T, when the program ends, the firm is 
required to satisfythe standard without using permits: E(K(t)) ~ i(T). The permit system is 
introduced to allow the firm to choose its own time path for accumulation of abatement capital 
and obeyance oCa stricter standard i 2• It is intermediate between a system with complete time 
flexibility, where the firm is only required to satisfy i 2 at the final time T and a system with 
no time fleXlbility, where the firm must satisfy the standard i(t) at any time. Summarizing, 
the firm has to solve the following constrained dynamic optimization problem: to minimize the 
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present value of investment costs during the whole program minus the scrap value of abatement 
capital and permits in the last period, 
T 
min { r e-rt [C(I)] dt _ [VkK(T) +VaA(T)]e-rT } (2.9)
a,I Jo 
subject to the following constraints, 
A(t) = a(t) (2.10) 
K(t) = I(t) - óK(t) (2.11) 
a(t) = f(t) E(K(t)) (2.12) 
A(t) 2:: O (2.13) 
I(t) 2:: O (2.14) 
A(O) = O; K(O) = k(fl ) (2.15) 
E(K(T)) ~ f(T) (2.16) 
When environmental policy is given by the scheme of standards (2.1 ) to (2.2), the standard 
f(t) is discontinuous at s. This implies that one must split the optimization problem into two 
parts in order to apply the maximum principIe. However, first order optimality conditions in 
both periods are similar. They can be rewritten in the following form (see Appendix: A): 
(2.17) 
(2.18) 
(2.19) 
. (2.20) 
and the terminal conditions, 
(2.21) 
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Az(T) 2:: Va j A(T) 2:: O ; A(T)(Az(T) - Va) = O (2.22) 
Equation 2.17 refers to optimal investment in abatement capital. Except for corner solutions, 
the shadow value of an additional unit of abatement capital (Al) must cqual marginal investment 
costs. The second cquation, (2.18) links the shadow value of a permit at the bank (Az) to the 
fum's abatement. The more the fum has invested in abatement capital, the more costly it is 
in terms of capital to reduce emissions even further (since E' (K) ::; O) and, hence, the higher 
the value of a permit at the bank. The shadow value of a permit at the bank (Az) is positive 
(Le. it is valuable to have permits at the bank) when the shadow value of abatement capital 
does not grow, or grows at rate lower than the depreciation corrected interest rate «r +6) Al)' 
Equations 2.19 and 2.20 link the stock of permits at the bank to its shadow value. If this shadow 
value is decreasing in real terms (i.e. rAz - ~z > O), then from (2.20) it fo11ows that A = O - it 
is not optimal to hold a positive stock of permits. On the other hand, if an optimal solution is 
charaderized by positive amounts ofpermits at the bank, the permits' shadow value must grow 
at exactly the interest rateo Along an optimal path the shadow value of a permit in the bank 
will never grow at rate higher than the interest rateo This follows from (2.20). If it would grow 
faster, the fum would want to bank an infinite number of permits, hence no optimal solution 
exists. 
Lemma 1 An additional permit at the bank is never valued negatively by the firm: 
AZ 2:: O Vt E [O,Tj (2.23) 
This is reasonable since the fum can ehoose to use the permit at any time and there are no 
costs ineurred by keeping the permit at the bank. 
Proof: Assume that this would not hold for a11 t, so that Az(tl) < Ofor some tI E [O, Tj. 
From cquation (2.19) and (2.20) it fo11ows that ~z < O for a11 t 2:: tI' This contradicts the 
terminal condition Az(T) 2:: VA 2:: O. 
Equation (2.18) then implies that along an optimal path, the shadow value of abatement 
capital grows at most at the rate (r +6). Furthermore if Az = Ofor some tI, then Az = Ofor a11 
t 2:: tI' Frem (A.18) ~z(tI) = -¡,tI ::; O and it was just denved that Az 2:: O. Hence, ~z(tI) = O. 
The same reasoning applies for a11 t 2:: tI and results in AZ = O for a11 t 2:: tI-
We now show that this system of banking is always advantageous to the fum compared to 
with a eommand-and-control poliey. Consider a fum that is not a110wed to bank permits, but is 
subject to a strict standard poliey: it has to satisfy the standard i(t) at any momento In terms 
of the permit system, the fum is not allowed to use any permits. This is equivalent to adding 
the constraint 
a(t) 2:: O (2.24) 
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to the cost minimization problem above. First order conditions for the CAC problem and its 
formal specmcation are given in the Appendix. It is immediately clear that allowing a firm 
to bank permits for later use decreases overall abatement expenditures to the mm. Allowing 
for the use of permits implies that the constraint (2.24) is removed from the mms decision 
problem. The optimal solution with permits wiIl be at least as good as the optimal solution 
under command-and-control policy. It is very likely to be better, causing cost savings, since the 
mm can smooth its investment. 
Let us assume now that S(K(T),A(T)) = O (or VI: = O and Va = O), that is, there is no 
value of abatement capital and permits after T. The firm starts to invest at a rate higher than 
1 = 6k(ll) (or k = O) at time SI, with O :s; SI < s. Before that time it was investing at rate 
6k(ll) to make up for depreciation. Ftom SI onwards the capital stock increases. The firm emits 
less than the standard and accumulates permits. At time S, the stricter standard l2 is imposed, 
while the mm has not accumulated enough abatement capital yet to satisfy it. The mm uses 
its banked permits to cover too high emissions, while it continues to invest at a high rate and 
to build abatement capital. At time S2, with S < S2 :s; T, the mm has accumulated enough 
capital and its emissions satisfy the strict standard. It decreases its investments to invest only 
for depreciation and stops using permits. At time T, the program stops and the firm receives 
the scrap value of abatement capital and permits, if any. This is an optimal path for low enough 
scrap values. 
If either VI: or Va is high, then the mm will continue to invest in abatement capital even if it 
satisfies the new stricter standard. Therefore, the definition of the optimal path will depend on 
the definition of the policy target or post-program policy. 
We can compare the optimal path under the permit policy descríbed above (800 figure 6) to 
the investment strategy when the mm faces a binding standard CAC (800 figure 7). The optimal 
path under a command and control policy is given by: 
(í) I(t) 6k(l¡) for t < S3 for all S3 E [O,s), 
(íí) I(t) > 6k(ll) for S3 :s; t < s such that at s, K(s) = k(l2), 
(ííí) I(t) 6k(l2) for S < t:s; T. 
This path is a feasible solution to the optimization problem (2.9), but it does not satisfy 
the first order conditions. This is not surprising; allowing the mm to bank permits improves its 
flexibility in planning its investment expenditures. Even in the highly simplified setting we use, 
banking permits results in cost savings. In reality, due to vanances in adjustment costs over 
time, even higher cost savings can be expected from the banking policy. 
10 
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2.1 Emissions tax for limited time 
It is in principIe possible for a regulator with perfect fuformation on firms abatement costs to 
set up a system of eIDÍssion taxes that leada the firm to the same time path of investment as 
it would choose under the permit program described above. The regulator should compute 
the optimal investment path and set a tax on emissions equal to the shadow value of banked 
permits, )'2, at any time. In the case of a system of emission troces, the firm has to pay a tax, 
T, for every unit of emissions. Thus, it also pays explicitly for the emissions that are below the 
standard. This is in contrast with the system ofpermits just described, where the firm only pays 
an implicit opportunity costo The optimization problem that the firm has to solve under taxes 
is to minimize the disoounted stream of abatement costs plus the eIDÍssions tax minus the scrap 
value of abatement capital and excess of abatement (which again represent firm's expectations 
on policy developments after T). 
(2.25) 
subject to constraints 2.10 to 2.16. Optimality conditions for the firm are: 
e'(I) ~ >:1 I ~ O I[>:l - C'(I)] =O (2.26) 
>:1 - (r + c5)>:1 (2.27)
T= E'(K) 
and terminal conditions 
(2.28) 
Assuming that an interior solution exists, these conditions are equivalent to those for an optimum 
under the permits system, (2.17) to (2.22), when the tax is set such that 
(2.29) 
where ),2 is the shadow value of permits from section 2. If the regulator sets taxes equal to this 
rate, the investment path chosen by an optimizing firm subject to these taxes equals that chosen 
by a firm subject to the banking permit described in section 2. 
One can conclude that it is possible to arrive at the same results with a tax as with a 
permit system. But note that this requires the regulator to have perfect knowledge of the cost 
functions of the firmo Whenever this is not the case it is impossible for the regulator to calculate 
the corred leveloftaxes. Moreover, the tax must be adjusted every perlod to follow the optimal 
path. On the contrary, for the permit system to reach the optimal path of investment it is only 
11 
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necessary that the regulator sets the level of standards, € 1 and €2. This difference in information 
requirements is a well known difference between troces and permits, see for example Baumol and 
Oates (1988). 
3 Borrowing emissions 
One could go a step further than the system described thusfar and allow the firm more flexibility. 
Consider a firm that must comply with the environmental policy defined by scheme (2.1) to 
(2.2), as described aboye, and assume now that the regulator endows the firm at time O with 
enough permits to comply with this emissions scheme. This leaves the firm completely free to 
allocate its emissions over time, or in formal terma, removes the A ~ Oconstraint (however, 
the requirement that A(T) ~ O remains). Borrowing is defined as allowing the firm to emit 
more than the standard at some time t even if it has no stock of saved permits, provided that 
it balances this with emission reductions below the standard later on. The structure described 
aboye and formalized below allows for such borrowing. 
Let B(t) denote total permit holdings ofthe firm, such that: 
B(O) = foT €(t)dt 
Emissions reduce this stock: 
B(t) = -E[K(t)] (3.1) 
so that: 
B(t) = L - fot E[K(s)]ds 
gives the stock of permits owned by the firm at time t. 
At the end of the program the firm must comply with the stricter standard, €(T) = €2 and 
therefore KT ~ k(€2), must hold. Also the firm must have paid off its "loans": B(T) ~ O is 
required. Like in section 2, the firm starts with abatement capital K(O) = k(€l) at t = O. In 
summary, the firm has to solve the following constrained dynamic optimization problem: 
(3.2) 
subject to the following constraints, 
B(t) = -E(K(t)) (3.3) 
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K(t) = l(t) - SK(t) (3.4) 
B(T) ~ O (3.5) 
l(t) ~ O (3.6) 
B(O) = L; K(O) = k(ll) (3.7) 
E(K(T)) ::; l(T) (3.8) 
First order conditions are: 

C'(I) ::; Al 1 ~ O I[Al - C'(I)] = O (3.9) 

A _'\1 - (r +S)Al 
 (3.10)3 - E'(K) 
(3.11) 

togcther with terminal conditions: 

(3.12) 
(3.13) 
Since the firm always needs to keep some permita in order to justify ita final emissions, it folIows 

that B(t) will always be positive. 

Lenuna 2 An additional permit at the bank is never valued negatively by the firm: 

A3 ~ O '\It E [O,Tj (3.14) 
Proof: 
We can solve equation (3.11) for Aa: 
Aa is the shadow value of one unit added to B, the stock of permita available to the firm, which 
cannot be negative ir at T emission permits have some nonnegative scrap value. The firm can 
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always keep them and receive this scrap value. Or otherwise it can use them and save some 
investment costs. IfVs > Othen A3(T) > OfolIows from the terminal condition (3.13). Since 
~(t) = e-rTertA3(T), it fo11ows that A3(t) > Ofor a11 t. 
¿Prom equation (3.10) it then follows that along an optimal path, ).1 < (r +Ó)A1must hold. 
Which means that Al, the shadow value of additional abatement capital, should not grow too 
fasto The optimal final path depends, again, on the scrap value functíon. If VK is high enough, 
the firm will invest higher quantities than the standard would require. If VK is low enough, 
say VK = O, then K(T) = k[P(T)] and the firm accumulates just enough capital to satisfy the 
requirements at T. The optimal path will depend on the discount rate and the shape of E(K). 
Finally, as long as PI < P2 and, as we have asssumed, the firm has convex emission and 
adjustment costs E"(K) > Oand C"(!) > O, it is relatively cheap to invest at the lower standard 
(lax standards) and more expensive to do so at stricter ones. Therefore, it is not optimal for 
the firm to borrow in the first phase of the program, for that would imply that the firm lets its 
capital depreciate. Then, along Ph the optimal path is determined by investment to maintain 
the capital stock. 
During the second period, where P2 is binding, the firm will have to invest more. This saves 
some costs, as delaying investment is always cheaper, but it also implies higher adjustment costs. 
Smooth investment is cheaper if the firm faces a convex investment cost functíon. Therefore, 
along t E [s,1j, the firm will distribute investment to achieve P2 : borrowing emissions during 
[Sl,S2) as it will be over the standard for that period, and compensating for the overuse of 
permits during [S2,1j by building a capital stock greater than required by the standard. 
Summarizing, borrowing tends to del ay investment in emissions reduction. Only when the 
standard becomes stricter, the firm starts building or increasing its abatement capital stock. 
During this time, the firm is borrowing emÍsSions against future reductions aboye the final 
standard. The rate of investment in the second period depends on the length of the period, 
adjustment costs and the rate of discount. Indeed, the higher the discount rate, the lower 
adjustment costs or the longer this first period, the later and slower the firm builds íts capital 
stock. Finally, the scrap value function, together with the borrowing rate in the earlier period, 
will determine the final position of the firm with respect to the standard. 
Comparing banking and borrowing policies dynamics we can conclude the firm might incur 
in the same net costs of abatement. However, banking is a preferred policy both in terms of 
emÍsSions distribution over time, as pollution is reduced earlier, and in terms of irreversibilities, 
as borrowing emissions against the future can yield ''pollute-and-close'' behavior of firms. 
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4 Competitive emission trading program with terminal time 
In this section only permit trade is considered. Again consider a firm that minimÍZes the día­
counted stream of abatement costs over the period [O, 7j. It is subject to some emission standard 
f(t) during the entire perlod but it may exceed this standard at some t if it buys sufficient per­
mits from other firms. If the firm emits less than the standard it saves some permits that can 
be sold in the same period to other firms in a competitive permit market. The market price of 
a permit is given by p(t). Let y(t) be the amount ofpermits the firm sells or buys in the market 
at time t. Then, y(t) is given by: 
y(t) = f(t) - E(K(t)) , (4.1) 
the difference between the standard and the firm's emission rate. If y(t) > 0, the firm is a net 
seller ofpermits and ify(t) < 0, the firm is a net buyer ofpermits. The firm invests in abatement 
capital in order to decrease its emission rate, increasing revenues of permit sales, if the flrm is 
net seller, or decreasing costa of permit purchases, if the firm is a net buyer. At the end of the 
period it is required that 
E(K(T)) ::; f(T), 
hence y(T) ~ O. The possibility oftrade in permits may also allow firms some flexibility in the 
timing of investments. This flexibility is large when firms in the permit market differ in initial 
capital stock, adjustment costs or depreciation rate. For example, a firm facing adjustment costs 
that are close to linear has incentives to delay its investments until the last periodo U ntil it has 
enough capacity to satisfy the standard, the firm buys permits from firms with more convex 
adjustment cost functions. 
Cost savings from this policy are derlved from temporary allocative efficiency, since all firms 
must comply at the end of the program with the standard. Complete allocative efficiency would 
be reached if firms could maintain their net position in the permit market beyond T. 
Firm's must pay their permit purchases if they are net buyers and receive some benefits if 
they are net sellers. We consider the same standard scheme specified in the aboYe section. The 
control problem for the firm then becomes: 
(4.2) 
subject to the following eonBtrains: 
k = J(t) - SK(t) (4.3) 
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y(t) = l(t) ­ E(K(t)) (4.4) 
12;:0 (4.5) 
(4.6) 
The main difference with the banking model is that firms must seU excess abatement at the 
prevailing price. First order conditions are derived in the Appendix and can be summarized as 
follows: 
e'(l) ~ Al 12;:0 l[Al - e'(l)] = O (4.7) 
>'1 = Al(t)(r + 6) +E'(K)p(t) (4.8) 
with the transversality condition: 
AI(T) 2;: Un; E(K(T)) ~ i(T); [A¡(T) - un][E(K(T)) - i(T)] = O (4.9) 
¿From equation (4.7), it fo11ows that the shadow price of abatement capital must at least equal 
the marginal cost of investment along an optimal path. If an interior solution is assumed, then 
Al = c' (1). DifIerentiating this with respect to time and rewriting (4.8) gives: 
Í = c' (l)(r + 6) + p(t)E' (K) (4.10)0" (1) 
It holds that e'(l) > O, e"(l) > O, p(t) 2;: O and E' (K) ~ O. Therefore, c' (I)(r + 6) > 
-p(t)E' (K) implies that investment increases over time. Since E"(K) > O, it follows that when 
the permit price, p, is constant and not too large so that c' (l)(r + 6) > -p(t)E' (K) holds 
for some K(t"'), one can conclude that investment is monotonically increasing for a11 t 2;: t"'. 
AdditionaUy, a constant investment function implies that: 
c'(I) = p(t)E'(K) (4.11)(r+6) 
or in words, the marginal cost of investment equals the discounted marginal value of additional 
abatement capital. The firm increases investment if marginal investment costs are lower than 
the discounted marginal cost ofthe last unit of emissions abated. In that case, the firm reduces 
emissions and sells the permits it does not need in the market. The firm pays an opportunity 
cost for every unit it emits. It always pays to reduce emissions if marginal costs are lower than 
marginal benefits; it always pays to buy them if costs are high and the firm has to comply with 
the standard. 
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The dynamics of investment capital are determined by the permit price. First, if the permit 
price increases at the rate of interest p(t) = ertp(O), then ,.\] = (r + 6)>'1 + ertp(O)E'(K(t)) 
determines the rate of investment of the firm in abatement capital. Second, if the permit price 
is constant (it decreases in real terms) p(t) = p(O), then"\] (r+6)>.] +p(O)E' (K(t)) determines 
investment in abatement. Finally, ifthe permit price increases in real terms p(t) = e(r+Q)tp(O), 
where a is a positive constant, given that the firm can not save permits for later use or sale, the 
shadow price of abatement will be increasing and the firm will increase the rate of investment: 
whether it does so to buy less permits or to sell more permits, depends on the net position of 
the firm in the market. 
A limited time horizon in permit markets suggests that, given that permits are not valid 
after T, the price of the permit may decrease over time and fall to zero when program reaches 
the terminal periodo Note that the price of the permit acts as the scrap value of a permit in the 
final periodo When permits are not expected to be valid after T, p(T) = O,that is, the shadow 
value of investment above the level required by the final standard wiIl be zero. Therefore, the 
final position on investment in abatement capital of the firm will depend exclusively on its 
expectations of future tighter emission limits. Indeed, the definition of permit programs with 
finite time horizons, where permits explicitly expire in the last period or the weak definition of 
the program induces firms to believe so, wiIl vanish any incentive to invest further than required 
by the standard. 
5 Conclusions 
We used a dynamic optimal control model with finite time horizons to characterize firms' 
emissions-reduction-investment when environmental policy targets are defined by the govern­
ment with adjustment periods. Several rules of intertemporal emissions trading have been 
combined to compare firms' abatement investment paths in a dynamic setting with finite time 
horizons. We show that intertemporal distribution ofemissions, even through the simple banking 
policy, results in cost savings for the firmo 
We obtained optimal trajectories of firms' investment when the banking policy allows the 
firm to decide its own intertemporal emissions distnbution. Compared to a standard command­
and-control setting, banking cost savings' justify firm's earlier investment. This result holds 
whenever adjustment costs increase with investment levels. A Plgouvian tax could determine 
the same optimal investment paths of banking if the tax is adjusted periodically. However, it 
requires perfect information on firms' abatement costs and adjustments of the tax rate over 
time. FinaIly, investment paths in apure permit market, where any excess or deficit of permits 
must be instantly cleared, depends on the path of price of a permito 
Some comments on the implications of these results related to the failure of the Acid Rain 
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Program for US electricity industry are needed. The Program establishes an emissions permit 
market to achieve an overall emissions standard within two temporal phases. Even though low 
trade among participating firms has occurred during the first phase, the program has induced 
fums's abatement and compliance with future emission standards. The low trade and low permit 
prices might be compensated by the success of the banking policy. If the firms had already 
advanced the first emission standard of the program established for the fust period, banking 
now permits to delay investment in the second period is not only the optimal behavior of the 
fum but it also results in cost savings, whatever the development of the permit price. Moreover, 
fums' expectations on future technology changes, spccially in an industry characterized with 
high investment and irreversible costs, may also additionally supports this delay in investment. 
In this sense, the banking policy enhances the dynamic efficiency of marketable permits, defined 
here as the incentives permits gives to polluters to invest in innovation and the direction in 
which innovative activities are stoored. 
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A Optimal trajectory for banking 
Consider the optimization problem as given by equations 2.9 to 2.16. This is an optimal control 
problem with two state variables, K and A, two control variables, a and 1 and a pure state 
contraint, equation 2.13. To obtain the optimality conditions for the optimal control problem 
we apply Pontryagin's maximum principIe for the two intervals [O, s] and [s, Tj (See Feichtinger 
and Rartl, 1986). We find for each time interval that the Lagrangian is given by: 
L = 	-AoC(I) + Al (t)(l - óK) +A2a(t) + JLIA(t)+ 
JL2(t)[E(t) -f(t) +a(t)] +JL3(t)[-E(t) +f(t) -a(t)] 	 (A.l) 
Rere AO E R, AO ~ O, Ai(t) are two co-state variables and JLj{t) are three dynamic Lagrange 
multipliers. Necessary conditions for an optimal solution are: 
-Aod(l) + AI(t) ::; O; 1 ~ O; I(AI - d(l)) = O 	 (A.2) 
(A.3) 
(AA) 
(A.5) 
JLI ~ O; JLIA(t) = O 	 (A.6) 
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fL<I ~ O; fL<I(E(K) - f +a) = O (A.7) 
fLS ~ O; fLS( -E(K) + f - a) = O (A.8) 
E(K) -f+a= O (A.9) 
at points 'i of discontinuity, there may be a jump 1] in A2 and it must hold: 
(A.10) 
For the period [O,s] these conditions must hold and additionally 
K(O) k(f l ); A(O) = O (A.ll) 
K(s) = Ks; A(s) = As (A.12) 
For the period [s, T] the conditions 2.17 to A.8 must hold and additionally: 
K(sO = Ks; A(s) = As (A.13) 
Al(T) ~ SKi E(K(T)) ~ f(T); [Al(T) - SK][E(K(T)) f(T)] = O (A.14) 
(A.15) 
The first oroer conditions can be rewritten, using (A.3) to substitute for (fL<I - fLS) and 
assuming that AO ¡. O, as: 
Al ~ C'(l); 1 ~ O; l(C'(l) - Al) = O (A.16) 
(A.17) 
(A.18) 
(A.19) 
togcther with the discontinuity condition (A.10) and the conditions(A.ll) to (A.15). 
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